We analyze the impact of …nancial globalization on asset prices, investment and the possibility of crashes driven by self-ful…lling expectations in emerging markets. In a two-country model with one emerging market (intermediate income level) and one industrialized country (high income level), we show that symmetric liberalization of capital out ‡ows and in ‡ows increases asset prices, investment and income in the emerging market. However, for intermediate levels of international …nancial transaction costs, we …nd that pessimistic expectations can be self-ful…lling, leading to a …nancial crash. The crash is accompanied by capital ‡ight, a drop in income and investment below the …nancial autarky level and more market incompleteness. We show that emerging markets are more prone to …nancial crashes simply because they have a lower income level and not because of the existence of market failures (moral hazard or credit constraints), bad monetary policies or exchange rate regimes.
Introduction
When capital ‡ows more easily into and out of emerging markets, do these markets reap the bene…ts of increased investment and a better ability to diversity their risk? Or do they face an increased likelihood of …nancial crash? The empirical literature seems to point towards the relevance of both these outcomes. On the one hand, a number of papers in the …nance literature 1 show that …nancial opening in emerging markets leads to a decrease in the cost of equity capital and can have a positive e¤ect on domestic investment. The macroeconomic literature 2 , using cross-country data, …nds more tenuous evidence that …nancial opening contributes positively to long-run growth. On the other hand, a voluminous literature on …nancial crisis emphasizes the risks of liberalization and the fragility of emerging markets …nancial systems to capital mobility. Wyplosz (2001) …nds that external …nancial liberalization is considerably more destabilizing in developing countries than in developed countries: it generates a boom-bust cycle. Another strand of literature, surveyed by Aizenman (2002) 3 concludes that liberalization of capital ‡ows has contributed to both banking and currency crises in emerging markets. Kaminski and Schmukler (2001) show that stock markets become more volatile in the three years following …nancial liberalization. They tend however to be more stable in the long run.
Figures 1 and 2 also suggest that …nancial openness alters the relation between the frequency of …nancial crashes and the level of income per capita. A crash is de…ned as a monthly drop in the stock index (in dollars) larger than two standard deviations of the average monthly change. We plot on the vertical axis the number of stock market crashes per year. Countries are ranked by log of GDP per capita on the horizontal axis. We divided the sample in periods for which countries were …nancially open and …nancially closed. Hence, among our 62 countries (34 emerging countries) 31 appear twice as they changed status during the sample years. Appendix 1 provides more details on the data and the way we de…ne …nancial openness. illustrates that for countries which have opened to capital movements a negative relation between the frequency of crashes and income per capita exists. This relation is statistically signi…cant. We have checked that this negative relative relation (and the absence of such relation for closed economies) is robust to changes of the de…nition of …nancial openess. The table strongly suggests that opening to capital movements has a much more dramatic e¤ect on the frequency of crashes in emerging markets than in developed ones, a point consistent with the literature cited above on the e¤ect of capital opening on crises in emerging markets.
This paper presents a general framework in which the two e¤ects of …nancial globalization on emerging markets-the decreased cost of capital and the increased frequency of crashes -can be reconciled. We also make sense of the di¤erential impact of …nancial globalization in emerging markets and developed countries. In our model, reducing asset market segmentation between emerging markets and developed countries increases asset prices, investment and income in the emerging market. Thus …nancial liberalization does perform its positive role of expanding diversi…cation opportunities and lowering the cost of investment in emerging markets. In certain circumstances, however, …nancial liberalization can facilitate …nancial crashes. We show that emerging markets, if su¢ciently open to capital movements, are more prone to …nancial crashes. This is due to the mere fact that their income is lower than developed countries and not necessarily because of fundamental macro-economic imbalances, a bad choice of exchange rate regime or the existence of market failures such as "moral hazard", credit constraints or an 'over-borrowing syndrome'. The point we are making here is therefore very general. In our model, the decision to invest by one agent in ‡uences the cost of capital of other investors through the impact of that decision on income and the price of assets. The type of market failure we build upon can therefore best be described as a pecuniary externality.
We present a two-country model of the world economy (one generic emerging market and one generic developed market). The emerging market and the developed economy di¤er only in the productivity levels of their labor. In both countries, domestic entrepreneurs decide whether or not to invest in risky …xed-sized projects, sell shares of their projects on the stock exchange, and acquire shares in other risky ventures developed at home or abroad.
When entrepreneurs expect that aggregate investment in their economy is large, they expect aggregate income and demand for equity investment to be high as well. Because assets are imperfect substitutes and transaction costs on international trade in assets give rise to a home bias in asset holding, this in turn means that the expected price of their shares on the stock exchange will be high.
The high prospective prices give them an incentive to invest in a large number of risky projects. In such a case, facilitating capital ‡ows increases investment in the emerging market, because it reduces its disadvantage of having a low income level that translates into low demand for domestic assets and high cost of capital. This is the demand e¤ect that is identi…ed in Martin and Rey (2001) . This paper discusses in detail the empirical evidence that supports the existence of such demand e¤ects on asset prices. In particular, Schleifer (1986) disentangles information e¤ects from pure demand e¤ects and
shows that an exogenous demand shift leads to signi…cantly higher asset prices.
The same logic may however go in the other direction: if entrepreneurs expect low levels of aggregate investment, they also contemplate a low level of aggregate income and do not expect to be able to raise capital at a good price. This deters them from developing risky projects. In such a case, domestic investors turn to the developed country stock exchange to buy equity shares and there are capital out ‡ows from the emerging market to developed countries. This circular chain of causality creates the possibility of multiple equilibria as long as investing in risky projects requires a …xed cost.
The "good equilibrium" is characterized by high asset prices, income and investment and in this case …nancial integration is bene…cial to the emerging market on these three dimensions. We call a crash the "bad equilibrium", characterized by a coordination failure resulting in low asset prices, income and investment. The likelihood that it exists is higher at an intermediate degree of …nancial segmentation. The reason why instability and crashes occur only for intermediate degrees of capital account liberalizations in our model can be understood as follows. If …nancial markets are perfectly integrated, international arbitrage ensures that asset prices are the same in the developed country and the emerging market. This rules out the possibility of multiple equilibria, since the price of equity shares in the emerging market is pinned down by the price of capital worldwide and independent of domestic expectations. Symmetrically, if …nancial asset markets are very segmented internationally, emerging markets agents have no choice but to invest at home since capital out ‡ows are heavily restricted. This rules out capital ‡ight and multiple equilibria but leads to a suboptimal world allocation of resources with lower equity prices (and therefore a higher cost of capital) in the emerging market compared to the developed country. In the model, lower income countries are more prone to …nancial crashes. The reason is that pessimistic expectations always have worse consequences on the expected asset prices in the lower income market.
In our model, asset prices and equity markets play a key role. The importance of stock markets in emerging economies has increased substantially in the past decade, as documented by Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler (2001) . However, we believe the mechanism identi…ed in this paper is not speci…c to the channel through which …rms …nance investment. Suppose …rms were to …nance investment projects through bank loans. As long as banks do not consider these projects and the associated bank loans to be perfect substitutes and that there exist transaction costs when banks lend to foreign …rms, the real interest rate charged by banks could be di¤erent across countries even for projects with identical risk. If higher domestic expected investment and therefore income leads to a larger pool of saving, which because of imperfectly integrated …nancial markets, bene…ts more (through a lower interest rate) the domestic …rms, then the key ingredients behind the circular causality mechanism that we analyze in this paper would also be present.
A closely related paper is Matsuyama (2001) , who studies the impact of …nancial globalization on inequality across countries when there is a borrowing constraint in domestic capital markets. Like
Matsuyama (2001), we …nd that in some cases, …nancial globalization leads to increased inequality across nations. One advantage of our model is that we are able to analyze all the intermediate cases of …nancial globalization (he contrasts autarky with free capital mobility). Also, we do not rely on any speci…c assumption regarding credit constraints on the domestic capital market. Instead we make the simple and realistic assumption that labor is more productive in one country than in the other. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) analyze development patterns in an economy with risky indivisible projects and show that free capital mobility may …rst lead to divergence with capital ‡owing to the richer country and then a reversal of capital ‡ows with convergence at a faster rate than if the two economies were closed. In their paper, as in Pagano (1993) , multiple equilibria may exist because assets are complements: the higher the number of assets, the more valuable existing assets become. This is not the mechanism at work in our model as assets are substitutes and multiple equilibria arise through an income e¤ect.
Our paper is also related to the "new economic geography" literature, in particular Krugman and Venables (1995) because our modelling of asset trade and of transaction costs has some similarities with the modelling of trade in goods in this literature. They show that "catastrophic" agglomeration of industries takes place for intermediate levels of trade costs because of cost and demand linkages.
Because in particular of the intertemporal nature of our model and of the absence of cost linkages, the mechanisms and results are however di¤erent.
More generally, our work is related both to the literature on …nancial integration (see Stulz 
The model
There are two countries ! (emerging) and " (industrialized) and two periods. In the beginning of the …rst period, # identical agents endowed with one unit of labor work. They also decide whether and how much to invest in risky projects which yield dividends in the second period. The good produced in the …rst period has labor as its only input and is freely tradable on a competitive market. It serves as the numeraire. The industrialized country has a higher marginal productivity of labor than the emerging country, so that its wage rate $ ! , equal to marginal productivity, is higher than $ " in the emerging country. This is the only asymmetry between the two countries that we assume.
The cost for an individual of engaging in investment projects is % + & (' " ), where ' " is the number of projects undertaken by a typical agent in the emerging market. We assume that these projects are of …xed unit size. The cost function for projects is convex and has a quadratic functional form 4 :
. A similar form applies to the industrialized country. In both locations, the marginal cost of undertaking projects rises as an agent decides to invest in more projects. As these projects are di¤erent from each other (see below for their payo¤ structure), the idea is that as investors do more projects they lose the advantage of specialization. In addition, a …xed cost % has to be paid to start investing in projects. We assume that this …xed cost is paid individually by each investor to all other agents in the economy so that aggregate income is not a¤ected by the …xed cost 5 . This can be interpreted for example as a …xed cost to become an entrepreneur such as a ‡at fee paid to the government and redistributed at the end of the period.
The …rst period is without uncertainty. In the second period, there are ( exogenous and equally likely states of nature, and the realization is revealed at the beginning of that period. As in Acemoglu and Zilliboti (1998) and Martin and Rey (2001) , the risky investment projects are such that each project gives dividends in only one state of nature. The payo¤ structure is such that project ) yields * in state ) and 0 otherwise. Note that investment projects in the two countries have the exact same ex-ante expected dividend, *+( . All projects are traded on the stock market at the end of period one, so that each project corresponds to an asset. This implies that buying a share in a speci…c project is equivalent to investing in a Arrow-Debreu security that pays in only one state of nature. This will give agents in both countries a strong incentive for diversi…cation that will materialize in the purchase of shares of both foreign and domestic projects. No duplication occurs in equilibrium so that each project/asset in the world is unique 6 . This could obviously lead to some exercise of monopolistic power. We however assume that project developers do not exploit this potential power. We assume that the number of states of nature ( is large enough so that ( , -# where 
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At the end of the …rst period, consumption takes place. Shares in the projects are sold on each of the stock markets. These shares can be traded internationally but international trade in assets between the industrialized country and the emerging market entails a transaction cost. An agent in either country who wants to buy assets in the other market must pay such a cost 7 , which may capture government regulations on capital ‡ows, di¤erences in regulations in accounting, banking and commission fees, exchange rate transaction fees and information costs. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) use a similar type of proportional transaction costs on capital ‡ows and focus on the cost of acquiring information about foreign countries. We will interpret …nancial globalization as a process through which these transaction costs are reduced but not eliminated. The situation of zero transaction costs will be interesting theoretically but we do not see it as empirically relevant. The presence of these transaction costs will translate into a home bias in asset holdings. We denote the transaction costs on in ‡ows / $% , and assume that they take the form of an iceberg cost 8 . This implies that the transaction fee is paid in shares and the resource cost is borne is second period. Agents have to buy 1 + / $% , 1 units of shares to receive one share. This modelling implies that the transaction involved by international trade in assets consumes real resources. Similarly, an agent in the emerging market 6 It can be checked that no investor has an incentive to duplicate an existing project as long as the total number of projects/assets is less than the number of states of nature. We assume that N is large enough so that this the case. The intuition is that as long as some states of nature have not been covered, the price of an asset associated to these states will always be higher than if the agent was to replicate an existing project/asset. 7 These costs are borne by the buyer. The results would be identical if sellers were to pay them. 8 These iceberg transaction costs are borrowed from the trade and geography literature. See Martin and Rey (2001) for a more precise description. This modelization allows the elasticity of substitution between assets to be the same for all agents and also does not require the formal introduction of a sector that performs the transaction. who buys shares from the industrialized country must pay a transaction cost 1 + / &'( , 1 on these out ‡ows. We will analyze both the case of symmetric liberalization -where these transaction costs are lowered simultaneously -and the case of asymmetric liberalization. Transaction costs could also be levied on dividends that are repatriated. This would increase the home bias as shown in Martin and Rey (2001) . Also, as in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2001) , the …nancial home bias could be derived in our model from the existence of transport costs on goods as goods need eventually to be shipped in the second period to pay the dividends.
We assume that the utility of an agent in each country is given by the non-expected utility function introduced by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989 Weil ( , 1990 ). This allows the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (which we assume to be 1 for simplicity) to be di¤erent from the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion 0 .
The …rst-period budget constraint of an agent in ! who undertakes projects is:
where 6 " is per-capita income in …rst period of the emerging country, 9 is the transfer (which in equilibrium is equal to % ) and 8 "$ and 8 "-are demands for shares of risky projects developed in the emerging market and in the industrialized country respectively. 7 "$ and 7 !-are the prices of the di¤erent assets. The budget constraint in the industrialized country is analogous. In the last period, income and consumption derive only from dividends of shares purchased in the …rst period. Hence, the budget constraint for an agent in ! is given by:
where we already made use of the fact that only a subset -# = #(' " + ' ! ) of the ( states of nature are spanned by traded assets. Hence, we can rewrite the utility of an agent in the emerging market as:
Note that in second period, this utility function is similar to the one introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz to represent preferences for di¤erentiated products. Because in equilibrium markets are incomplete, consumption in second period is zero in some states of nature 9 . We therefore need to restrict 0 to be between 0 and 1. As 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between assets (see below), this again resembles the assumption in the di¤erentiated products literature that the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent varieties is greater than 1. This restriction also implies that assets are substitutes rather than complements as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) so that a source of multiple equilibria that they analyse does not exist here.
3 When things go well
Investment and portfolio decisions
Agents in both countries choose consumption (2 "1 and 2 !1 ) and investment (the number of projects ' " and ' ! ) at the beginning of the …rst period. For this, they need to form expectations about the number of projects in which other agents will engage, because it will have an impact on the price of the assets that they will sell at the end of the …rst period. We will see in the next section that a coordination problem can arise such that in some equilibria, no investment is performed. We …rst solve the model for the case of an equilibrium in which both countries invest in risky projects (' " 5 ' ! , 0) so that no "crash" occurs. Agents choose optimally their portfolio of assets (domestic and foreign). For notational simplicity, we note that as projects/assets are ex-ante symmetric, the demand for each asset in a given country will be identical 10 : we call 8 "" the demand for shares of a "typical" asset in the ! market by an agent in that market. 8 "! is the demand for an asset of the " market by an agent in the ! market. Also, because of the symmetry of projects and agents in each country, all assets in a given country have the same price which we denote by 7 " and 7 ! , respectively.
Hence, the equilibrium is de…ned as a set of allocations (2) and (3)
imize 1 ! subject to "'s budget constraints (the analogous of equations (2) and (3)); 3) asset markets clear:
Goods markets clear:
The …rst order conditions for maximization for an agent in the emerging market imply the following (where expectations are denoted by a superscript :):
2 "1 = 6 " 1 + 3 (6)
10 In a given country, agents are di¤erent in the sense that they choose di¤erent projects but they choose identical portfolios and consumption patterns.
The equality between marginal cost and the expected price of the asset implies that the number of projects depends positively on the expected share price. Note also that the elasticity of substitution between assets is constant and equal to the inverse of the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion, 0.
Analogous conditions hold in the industrialized country.
For all agents in the economy to invest, it must be that the expected pro…tability of such projects is positive, or 7
This can be rewritten as 1 2 7
2 0 "¸% . If the …xed cost is higher than this upper bound, we need to analyse equilibria in which a fraction only of agents invest and the number of projects is determined by a zero pro…t condition. We do this in appendix III. The analysis and results are not qualitatively di¤erent so we focus on the case where all agents invest. We also assume an upper bound for the …xed cost such that we restrict our attention to equilibria in which all agents invest in the industrialized country.
Using the budget constraint and the …rst-order conditions above, the typical demand by agents in the emerging economy for shares of a domestic project (8 "" ) and for shares of a industrialized country project (8 "! ) are given by:
where shares that has the same form as those derived in trade models with transportation costs and DixitStiglitz type preferences. Note also that the demand for individual shares increases with income, and decreases with the total number of projects/assets. Finally, demand for foreign shares decreases with transaction costs on international trade in assets. Even for identical asset prices, a home bias will emerge in asset demands.
Projects have a …xed unit size and population is equal in each country 11 , so that the equilibrium on each stock market (inclusive of those shares that serve to pay the transaction costs) implies for a speci…c asset/project:
We discuss the consequences of di¤erent population size in appendix VI.
where ; $% = (1 + / $% ) 1¡1/* = 1 and > = 7 " +7 ! is the relative price of assets between emerging and industrialized markets. These two equations give the equilibrium conditions on the stock market for a typical asset in the emerging market and a typical asset in the industrialized market. There are # (' " + ' ! ) such equilibrium conditions. In the parenthesis, the …rst term represents the demand coming from domestic agents and the second term the demand coming from foreigners (inclusive of the transaction costs). Note that these equations imply a …nancial home-market e¤ect, in the sense that local income will have a more important impact on the local asset market than foreign income, as long as ; &'( and ; $% are less than 1, i.e. as long as some transaction costs exist 12 .
The stock market equilibrium implies that total world income in the …rst period is …xed. To see this, note from the stock market equilibrium that:
Using the optimal investment rule and the de…nition of world income, we get that
Total consumption in the world is given by the world resource constraint
.
It is useful to rewrite the price of assets in terms of the relative price using the constraint on world income and the asset markets equilibrium. These become:
This implies that an increase in the relative price of assets corresponds to an increase in investment in the emerging market and a decrease of investment in the industrialized one. The relationships with per-capita income are as follows:
An increase in the relative price of assets in the emerging market is associated with an increase in income in this country.
Equilibrium relationship between asset prices and income shares
We …rst examine the case of symmetric transaction costs (; $% = ; &'( = ;). We believe that this is the most empirically relevant case as emerging economies that liberalized capital movements, with the objective for example of attracting foreign capital, liberalized both out ‡ows and in ‡ows. We will analyze in Section 5 the case where this liberalization is not fully symmetric.
As world income is …xed, it proves convenient to de…ne 8 2 = 6 " +(6 " + 6 ! ) as the share of income in the emerging market. Equation (9) of the stock market equilibrium can be rewritten as:
12 It is easy to check that if transaction costs were levied on the dividends in the second period at the level ! ! , then
) 1¡1&' and " () = (
) 1¡1&' so that the home bias would be even larger.
Note that if ; = 1 (zero transaction costs) then > = 1, which implies that without any …nancial segmentation, the price of assets is identical in the two countries.
There are three equilibrium relations that help us solve the model in the case with positive investment in both countries. These are the income equation (2), the optimal investment equation (5), and the equilibrium on the stock markets (9) . By eliminating the optimal investment equation, we can reduce the model to two equilibrium relations between 8 2 and >, the share of income and the relative asset price in the emerging market. From (11), we get immediately the equilibrium income relation, which we call the 6 6 schedule:
where
, is the share of wage income in the emerging market. The equilibrium 6 6 relation says that an increase in the relative asset price > generates an increase in 8 2 , the income share of the emerging market. The reason is that projects are sold at a higher price and more projects are started.
Combining the optimal investment equation with the equilibrium on the stock markets (12) , which pins down the equilibrium relative asset price, we get a second relation between 8 2 and >, which we call the >> schedule:
This equilibrium relationship re ‡ects that a higher share of income in the emerging market leads to a higher relative asset price (we show in appendix II that ?8 2 +?> , 0). An increase in income in the emerging market leads to an increase in saving which, as long as markets are segmented (; = 1), falls disproportionately on domestic assets. The increase in demand in turn generates higher asset prices in the emerging market. This mechanism is the …nancial market size e¤ect identi…ed in Martin and
Rey (2001).
On …gure 3, we illustrate the equilibrium as the intersection of the 6 6 and >> schedules. The important result is that the relative price of assets in the emerging market is always less than 1 as long as the two markets are not perfectly integrated (; 6 = 1) and 8 # = 1+2. In appendix III, we show that the two curves only cross once, so that only one "good" equilibrium exists. It can also be shown that this equilibrium is stable, for all levels of transaction costs, a result di¤erent from the "new economic geography" literature.
The asset price in the emerging market is less than in the industrialized country, the more so, the larger the di¤erential in productivities. Note that this implies that investment in the emerging market will be less than in the industrialized market even though projects have, ex-ante, the same payo¤s.
This also implies that as long as international …nancial markets are segmented, the di¤erential in productivity will be magni…ed by di¤erential investment (8 2 = 8 # = 1+2). To see this graphically, If …nancial markets (; = 1) were perfectly integrated, the >> curve would be vertical at > = 1.
In such a case, an increase in the wage level of the emerging market, a shift of the 6 6 curve has no e¤ect on the relative asset prices and therefore would have no ampli…cation e¤ect on relative income.
Financial globalization and asset prices
We now analyze the impact of a decrease in transaction costs on international trade in assets which causes ; to rise. The e¤ect of an increase in ; on the >> curve can be seen by examining how 8 2 is a¤ected by an increase in ; for a given >:
This expression is negative as long as > = 1 that is as long as 8 # = 1+2. The symmetric decrease in transaction costs is illustrated in …gure 5 and implies a rightward shift of the >> curve. The 6 6 curve, meanwhile, is una¤ected.
The fall in transaction costs causes both the income share in the emerging market and the relative price of assets to increase. The intuition is that lower transaction costs on international trade in assets attract foreign investment as the price of a typical asset in the emerging market is lower than one on the industrialized market, even though the assets are identical ex-ante. As the asset price in the emerging market becomes higher, the incentive to invest in that country is strengthened, so that 
Financial globalization and the current account
It is interesting to investigate the impact of …nancial globalization on the …rst period current account of the emerging market in our setting. The current account is the di¤erence between the country's production and its investment and consumption :
It is easy to check from (13) and (14) that if ; = 0, then > 2 = $ " +$ ! so that the current account is balanced. As > 2 increases with lower transaction costs and is always higher than $ " +$ ! when ; , 0, the current account of the emerging market is in de…cit. The current account de…cit of the emerging market increases with lower transaction costs on trade in assets (higher ;). This is consistent with the previous section where we showed that liberalizing capital movements would generate higher relative asset prices in the emerging market. The capital in ‡ows generated by such liberalization are just the mirror image of the adjustment in prices. Capital in ‡ows are larger than out ‡ows as agents in the industrialized economy take advantage of the lower asset prices in the emerging market. This is made easier as transaction costs between the two markets decrease.
Financial globalization and market incompleteness
In the "good" equilibrium …nancial globalization alleviates market incompleteness, thus reduces the volatility of consumption in the second period. The reason is that the total number of assets increases as transaction costs decrease. The total number of assets is -# = #(' " + ' ! ) = #(7 " + 7 ! ). It can easily been shown that the total number of assets is increasing in > so that ?-# +?; , 0. This just comes from the convexity of the investment cost function: as the price of assets increases in the emerging market with lower transaction costs, the number of assets in the emerging market increases more than it decreases in the industrialized country. From that point of view, …nancial globalization is stabilizing. However, this is when "things go well" that is when agents are optimistic about investment prospects in the emerging market. In the next Section, we analyze a case when "things go wrong".
In this case, …nancial globalization can become destabilizing.
4 Self-ful…lling expectations and …nancial integration: when things go wrong
Until now, we have focused on equilibria in which both countries invest in a positive number of projects.
However, the decision to invest at the beginning of the period depends crucially on the expected price of assets at the end of the period when the stock markets open and shares in the projects are traded.
The expected asset price (which can be interpreted as the inverse of the cost of capital) determines whether investment is pro…table. We now investigate under what condition a crash driven by selfful…lling expectations can occur. In particular, we are interested in the impact of transaction costs on this possibility. We ask the following question: under which conditions, can a rational expectations equilibrium exists in which agents in the emerging market do not invest? Or to put it another way, when is the expected price low enough that a single agent will …nd it unpro…table to invest? The condition for this to happen is that
¡ % · 0 which implies that the pro…tability condition is not ful…lled or that no agent will deviate from the zero-investment equilibrium. e ' " in this condition is the investment that would be done by a single "pessimistic" agent if she anticipates that no other single agent will invest (so #' 0 " = 0) . The optimal investment rule e ' " = 7 0 " still applies here. This agent is small (# is large) so that her decision does not a¤ect aggregate income or investment.
Suppose that ' 0 " = 0. Aggregate income in the emerging market is #6 0 " = #$ " as expected wealth goes to zero. As world income is …xed, expected income in the industrialized country increases by the amount it falls in the emerging market. This expected change in the distribution of world income is important because it determines the expected relative demands for assets in the emerging and industrialized economies. Using the stock market equilibrium (9) in this case, it can be checked that the expected relative asset price when agents in the emerging market are pessimistic is:
Note that the expected relative price in this case decreases with …nancial globalization (higher ;) at low levels of ; and then increases at high levels of …nancial globalization. The pro…tability of investing in projects is:
The condition for the zero-investment equilibrium to exist can be rewritten using equations (17) and (18):
The pro…t function is U-shaped as a function of ; and so inequality (20) can be satis…ed for intermediate levels of transaction costs.
For multiple equilibria to exist, it must be that for a given set of parameter values, a "good" equilibrium exists when ' From (20) it can be checked that the zero-investment equilibrium cannot occur without capital ‡ows (; = 0) or with perfect capital mobility (; = 1). This is intuitive. In a situation of …nancial autarky, agents can only save by buying domestic assets. This puts a ‡oor on the demand for domestic assets and hence on their expected price as capital ‡ight is impossible. In a situation of perfect capital mobility, > = 1, so arbitrage implies that agents in the industrialized country would rush to buy the assets in the emerging market in the event of a crash. This rules out a crash on asset prices in the emerging market. In this case, if it is pro…table to invest in the industrialized country it must be so also in the emerging market. Another way to say this is that a global …nancial crash is not possible. This is the same reasoning as for the impossibility of a crash in autarky.
The possibility of multiple equilibria and its dependence on transaction costs is illustrated in …gure cost % such that in the case of multiple equilibria, the good equilibrium is characterized by all agents investing then the zero pro…t frontier is given by the dashed horitontal line. In this case, multiple equilibria arise for the emerging market between ; 1 and ; 2 . If the …xed cost is higher, the "good" equilibrium in the emerging market is one where only a fraction of agents invest and multiple equilibria arise for a larger set of transaction costs (the zero pro…t line is shifted upward). If the …xed cost is lower, the area of multiple equilibria shrinks.
As is usual in models with multiple equilibria, circular causation is at work here. If agents believe that other agents will undertake no project, they then expect aggregate income in the emerging market at the end of the period to be low. Lower expected income entails a lower demand for assets. When …nancial markets are segmented and assets are imperfect substitutes, then this fall of demand of assets will fall disproportionately on local assets. This in turn generates a low relative asset price in the emerging market. This is a home bias e¤ect. Finally, the optimal investment rule says that investment depends positively on the expected asset price which we can interpret as the inverse of the cost of capital. The circular causality mechanism is close to the agglomeration phenomena described in the "new economic geography" literature. Here, we could talk of an "agglomeration of expectations" which produces a coordination failure. The reason for the lower vulnerability of the industrialized economy to …nancial crashes, is that the demand for assets in that market even when depressed by pessimistic expectations is always higher than in the emerging market. This in turn implies a higher price for assets and higher pro…tability on the industrialized country asset market even when bad times are expected: the industrialized country can never be as pessimistic about its own income level and therefore its asset prices as the emerging market.
How do fundamentals a¤ect the possibility of a …nancial crash? For a given distribution of wage income (a given 8 # ), equation (20) shows that when "world" productivity and wage levels ($ " + $ ! ) are high, the pro…t function of a single "pessimistic" agent is higher and therefore the set of parameters for which a …nancial crash is possible is smaller. The reason is that greater world income generates a higher demand for shares, irrespective of expectations, which partially will bene…t the emerging market.
Also, fundamentals in the emerging market are important. For given world fundamentals ($ " +$ ! ), a higher productivity and wage level in the emerging market (a higher 8 # ) will increase the pro…t level of a "pessimistic" agent as we know ; = 1. The reason is that higher local income will generate higher demand for shares, which because of transaction costs on capital ‡ows, will disproportionately favor shares of the emerging market. Note that the negative relation between income per capita and the vulnerability to crashes only appears when …nancial integration is high enough, a fact that accords with the two graphs we present in introduction.
The …nancial crash in the emerging market is characterized by low asset prices, investment, income and consumption (both in …rst period and in second period). Per-capita income in the emerging market is lower in the case of a …nancial crash ($ " ) than in autarky (2(1 + 3)$ " +(2 + 3)). This level is itself the lowest for the emerging market among all "good" equilibria with positive investment.
Also, contrary to what occurs in the "good" equilibrium, in the event of a crash, the emerging country experiences a current account surplus, basically because it has no assets to sell. In this case, we can also characterize the …nancial crash as a situation of capital ‡ight since the only assets that agents can buy to save and diversify risk are foreign.
These characteristics of the crash …t the stylized facts of the emerging markets. In particular, investment in our model is the component which is hit the hardest, consistent with the …ndings of Tornell and Westermann (2001) . They also …nd that the bust is followed by a recession. Other authors have insisted on the fall in asset prices that are typically the starting point of the crisis and the reversal in the current account situation.
We have seen that "when things go well", …nancial globalization decreases the volatility of secondperiod consumption as it decreases market incompleteness measured by (( ¡ #' " ¡ #' ! ). Obviously, when investment crashes in the emerging market the number of assets falls in that country. To see how the number of assets at the world level is a¤ected by the crash, we compare the extent of market incompleteness in the case of a …nancial crash (' " = 0) to the measure of market incompleteness in the non crash equilibrium in …nancial autarky (; = 0), which we know is the situation where market incompleteness is at its maximum for the "good" equilibrium. The total number of assets in the later situation is higher than in a situation of …nancial crash 13 . Hence,market incompleteness is higher in the situation of the …nancial crash than in the situation of …nancial autarky. This implies that in a crash not only income and consumption levels are lower but volatility of second-period consumption is also higher.
We have de…ned the "pessimistic equilibrium" as one where all agents in a given country decide rationally, given their expectations, not to invest. A natural question arises whether asymmetric equilibria may exist also in which only a fraction of agents is expected to invest. In that case, even though agents share the same expectations they do not have the same actions. For such equilibria to exist, it must be that in equilibrium the expected pro…t of investing is zero. This de…nes the portion of agents (which we call D " ) who invest. We show in appendix IV that when % 6 % 1 = 1# " 2+1 these asymmetric equilibria cannot exist. Such equilibria can exist however when % , % 1 .
The introduction of riskless and low return projects would make a crash possible even in autarky. In such circumstances, if agents expect that no high return risky investment projects will be implemented and that agents will substitute to low return riskless projects, they expect aggregate income, demand for assets of the risky projects and their relative price to be low. In e¤ect, the possibility of an alternative form of domestic investment with low return would be similar to the possibility of capital ‡ight in our model. This would resemble the logic of the model of Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1989) . As long as the cost of riskless investments is not too high, a crash of prices of risky investment projects would be possible, even in autarky. However, facilitating the purchase of foreign assets with high return would still increase the possibility of a …nancial crash, albeit one of a di¤erent nature: agents in the emerging market would substitute into risky high-return foreign assets in place of riskless low-return domestic assets. The emerging market would still be more vulnerable to this type of crash than the industrialized country: in the pessimistic case, its income and therefore demand for domestic 13 In …nancial autarky the total number of assets is #[2$%(
assets would still fall more than those of the industrialized country.
Asymmetric …nancial liberalization

Asymmetric transaction costs and the "good" equilibrium
Our framework allows us to distinguish between transaction costs on …nancial in ‡ows and out ‡ows, so that we can analyze the impact of asymmetric liberalization policies. In the case of asymmetric transaction costs, the 6 6 schedule, (equation 13) still applies. The >> schedule that de…nes the stock market equilibrium is however altered in the following way:
Contrary to the case of symmetric transaction costs, the relative price of assets in the emerging market may be equal to or greater than 1. For this to happen, transaction costs on out ‡ows must be higher than on in ‡ows (or ; $% , ; &'( ) in the following way:
Note that the di¤erence between transaction costs on in ‡ows and out ‡ows must be higher the larger the di¤erence in productivities, and the higher the overall level of transaction costs is. The reason is that lower transaction costs on in ‡ows e¤ectively increase the demand and the price of assets in the emerging market, and the opposite is true for transaction costs on out ‡ows. The impact of a decrease in transaction costs on in ‡ows (an increase in ; $% ) is shown on …gure 6 as a rightward shift of the modi…ed >> curve (see appendix V for the proof). To compare the impact of symmetric and asymmetric …nancial globalization, we have depicted both types on the same graph. Starting from a situation with identical transaction costs on in ‡ows and out ‡ows (point @), a symmetric decrease in transaction costs leads to point A which implies an increase in both > and 8 2 , if $ ! , $ " . A decrease in transaction costs on in ‡ows, will shift the equilibrium to point A, implying a larger increase in both > and 8 2 than in the symmetric case 14 . Remember that an ampli…cation mechanism is at work as higher demand for assets from the industrialized market generated by lower transaction costs on in ‡ows, induces an increase in the asset price of the emerging market which itself generates an increase in income (through a wealth e¤ect) and investment. This implies a higher domestic demand for assets in the emerging market which reinforces the price e¤ect.
Both the substitution and the income e¤ect go in the same direction.
It is easy to check that a decrease in transaction costs on out ‡ows shifts the modi…ed >> curve on the left as shown on …gure 7. Both the asset price and the income level decrease because lower transaction costs on out ‡ows induce domestic agents in the emerging market to switch from domestic to foreign assets. Note that contrary to the case of symmetric liberalization, the sign of the impact of asymmetric liberalization on asset prices and income share does not depend on the di¤erence in wage rates. 
Asymmetric transaction costs and …nancial crashes
We can perform the same analysis as in section 4 and analyze how asymmetric transaction costs a¤ect the possibility of a …nancial crash driven by self-ful…lling expectations. The condition for the zero-investment equilibrium to exist becomes:
Hence, quite intuitively, a combination of low transaction costs on out ‡ows and high transaction costs on in ‡ows makes it easier to have a zero-investment equilibrium where a "pessimistic" agent does not expect it to be pro…table to start investment projects. Such combination increase capital out ‡ows and decrease in ‡ows, so that the expected asset price is low.
6 Domestic and international …nancial liberalization
Domestic transaction costs and the "good" equilibrium
We can also use our model to analyze how the interaction of domestic and international …nancial liberalization a¤ect asset prices and investment. To do this, we introduce a new type of transaction costs on …nancial markets of the emerging country. More precisely, we assume that on top of the transaction costs on in ‡ows and out ‡ows (which in this section we take to be identical), agents in the emerging market, when they buy domestic assets pay a domestic transaction cost, which also takes the form of an iceberg cost. This may be thought as a proxy for domestic …nancial under-development.
We assume that no such transaction cost hampers the domestic market in the industrialized market so that we depart from the rest of the paper where the only di¤erence between the two countries was their productivity level. We call ; 4 , the transformation of domestic transaction costs:
where / 4 is the domestic transaction cost which we assume is lower than the international transaction cost so that ; 4 , ;. The model is unchanged except for the stock market equilibrium conditions which become:
his just says that higher domestic transaction costs reduce asset demand from domestic agents.
The >> schedule now becomes:
Hence, a decrease in domestic …nancial transaction costs shifts the >> curve to the right and induces an increase in asset prices, investment and income. The working is qualitatively the inverse of the one shown in …gure 8. This is not surprising as an increase in transaction costs on out ‡ows and a decrease in domestic transaction costs both lead to an increase of demand of assets by domestic agents.
Domestic transaction costs and …nancial crashes
The introduction of domestic transaction costs makes it easier to get the zero-investment equilibrium.
The reason is that by decreasing demand for domestic assets it decreases further the relative expected asset price and therefore expected pro…tability of investment projects when agents are pessimistic. To see this, we derive the expected pro…t when agents in the emerging market are "pessimistic":
The expected pro…t is lower, the higher the domestic transaction costs (the lower ; 4 ). Hence, lower transaction costs on domestic markets in the emerging market will reduce the parameter set for which zero-investment equilibrium driven solely by self-fulling expectations is possible.
Welfare implications
The welfare implications are numerous and complex. In the previous sections, we have seen that lowering transaction costs on asset trade had consequences on: real resources lost in the transaction, relative asset prices, investment and income and therefore consumption in both …rst and second period, the degree of market incompleteness and therefore the volatility of consumption in second period. Lowering transaction costs on trade in assets could also move the emerging market in a totally di¤erent situation characterized by a …nancial crash driven by self-ful…lling pessimistic expectations.
We …rst analyze the welfare impact of lower transaction costs in the "optimistic" case with positive investment in both countries. The level of utility of an agent in the emerging market is given by the following expression:
where B is a constant. There are three distinct e¤ects of lowering transaction costs on international asset trade that can be identi…ed in the three last terms of the above equation: 1) an income e¤ect:
For the emerging market, we know it will be a positive e¤ect for a symmetric decrease of transaction costs on in ‡ows and out ‡ows and for a decrease of transaction costs on in ‡ows. It will be negative on income in the case of a decrease of transaction costs on out ‡ows. 2) a price e¤ect: the price of assets of the emerging market will follow the same pattern as income. However, the welfare e¤ect may be di¤erent. On the one hand, for a given income, higher prices in the emerging market imply lower demand for those assets which lowers welfare. On the other hand, higher asset prices in the emerging market generate higher investment and a higher number of assets and therefore more diversi…cation possibilities. If 0 , 1+2, so that agents are "very" risk averse, the increase in diversi…cation possibility will be highly valued and an increase in 7 " will increase welfare. 3) a direct e¤ect: with lower transaction costs on out ‡ows (higher ; &'( ) , it becomes less costly to diversify. Hence, this e¤ect is always positive.
We will not be able to analytically derive the welfare impact of decreasing transaction costs on trade in asset for all levels of transaction costs. However, we can evaluate welfare impacts of liberalization of capital ‡ows around the autarky equilibrium and the perfect capital mobility equilibrium. For example, an asymmetric decrease of transaction costs around the autarky situation has the following impact on utility in the emerging economy:
As $ " = $ ! , it implies that if 0¸1+2, then the expression above is always positive and utility increases with liberalization of capital out ‡ows 15 . The intuition is that in this case of high risk aversion, the possibility to diversify at a lower cost is highly valued by agents of the emerging market.
If 0 = 1+2 and the wage di¤erence is su¢ciently large, then the negative income e¤ect dominates and the utility of agents in the emerging market will decrease. Evaluated in the perfect capital mobility equilibrium, the impact of imposing restrictions on capital out ‡ows would always be negative for welfare as:
The impact of a decrease in transaction costs on in ‡ows on welfare evaluated at autarky is given by:
which is always positive. This is also the case when evaluated in the perfect capital mobility case.
The impact of a symmetric decrease in transaction costs on in ‡ows and out ‡ows on welfare evaluated at autarky is given by:
15 Note that if the two countries have equal wages, the utility always increases with liberalization of capital ‡ows.
which is always positive 16 . This is also the case when evaluated at ; = 1. This is not surprising as we know that all e¤ects described above are positive in this case for the emerging market.
These results on welfare are valid only for the "good" equilibrium and as usual in models with possible multiple equilibria, we cannot say anything de…nitive about welfare. In cases where the crisis equilibrium is a possible equilibrium we can however show that if the emerging market falls in the crisis equilibrium its welfare is always less than in the "good" equilibrium at the same level of transaction cost. This is obvious as the crisis equilibrium implies lower income and therefore less consumption (in both periods) and more market incompleteness (as measured by the di¤erence between the number of states and the number of assets) and therefore more second-period consumption volatility. However, it is impossible to give a de…nitive answer to the question: should emerging economies liberalize capital movements, say in a symmetric fashion (an increase in ;)?. We know that if they could, they should go all the way to perfect capital mobility (; = 1), because in this case income in the emerging market is maximized, market incompleteness is minimized and …nancial crash cannot occur. However, our view is that transaction costs always hinder international trade in assets (due to di¤erence in regulations, cost of acquiring information, exchange rate movements...) even without government imposed transaction costs. We can answer a more limited but relevant question: is welfare in the emerging economy higher in the autarky equilibrium or in the crisis equilibrium? The di¤erence between the two levels of welfare is given by:
where parameters (in particular the level of transaction costs) must be such that a crisis is a possible equilibrium. The …rst term of the expression is positive and re ‡ects the fact that income is higher in autarky than in crisis with capital movements. The last term is negative and re ‡ects the welfare gain of being able to better diversify by purchasing foreign assets even in a …nancial crash. The second term has an ambiguous sign and re ‡ects the fact that in a crisis equilibrium there are more assets to buy than in autarky but which must be purchased at a higher price. If agents are su¢ciently risk averse (high 0) they will value this and therefore the expression is negative. When we evaluate this expression at levels of ; for which a …nancial crash is possible (that is between the two roots of the quadratic expression 23), we …nd that the sign is ambiguous. In particular, if agents are not too risk averse (low 0) welfare can be higher in autarky than in the …nancial crisis equilibrium. This is because in this case the welfare gain of being able to buy foreign assets is not valued very much and the loss of income in the …nancial crash situation is what matters most. For the industrialized country, the welfare impact of a crash in the emerging market has an ambiguous e¤ect on welfare. The reason is that even though its income rises because of the in ‡ows of capital coming from the emerging market, its diversi…cation opportunities decrease as the total number of assets decreases. For 0 = 1+2, for 16 It can be shown that, despite its negative impact on its income, this is also true for the industrialized country.
example, it is easy to check that the income e¤ect dominates. For high coe¢cients of risk aversion, however, the loss in diversi…cation opportunities may dominate.
Again, our implications for welfare should be taken with caution as we can not say which equilibrium will prevail. Hence, our model can only point to the conclusion that …nancial globalization carries bene…ts and risks in terms of welfare for emerging markets.
Conclusion
Under which conditions can …nancial globalization be held responsible for the recent series of …nancial crashes in emerging markets? In answering this question, the existing literature has insisted on the fact that …nancial globalization, because it makes borrowing on world …nancial markets easier and less costly, may strengthen the potential danger of market failures prevalent in emerging markets: in particular, moral hazard and credit constraints have been shown to facilitate the advent of …nancial crisis driven by self-ful…lling expectations. In this paper, we show that the existence of such market failures is not a necessary condition for emerging markets to become vulnerable to a …nancial crash when capital ‡ows are liberalized. Both the potential bene…t of …nancial globalization (in terms of cost of capital, investment and income) and the higher vulnerability of emerging markets to a …nancial crash come from the same and unique factor that di¤erentiates emerging markets and industrialized countries in our model: their productivity and income level. The higher vulnerability is not due to bad fundamentals, bad institutions, bad …nancial markets (credit or liquidity constraints), bad incentives (bailouts) or bad exchange rate regimes. This is not to say of course that these problems do not exist or do not constitute important channels through which …nancial globalization can make emerging markets more vulnerable to a …nancial crisis 17 . But it suggests that the risks of liberalization of capital ‡ows for emerging markets are a very general feature. That …nancial globalization can make emerging markets more vulnerable to a …nancial crash under the mere condition that these countries have a lower income than industrialized countries has also potentially important policy implications. The recent literature which has emphasized the key role of credit constraints and moral hazard to explain crashes in emerging markets has logically recommended policies which address the informational and institutional frictions which are at the origin of these credit market imperfections. Among such policies, Mendoza (2001) for example, cites microeconomic policies such as the development of credit bureaus in Mexico. More transparency, better information, better banking regulation have also been recommended. Similarly, currency mismatches in …xed exchange rate regimes have listed as prime suspects in the crises of these countries which has led several countries to switch to ‡oating. Our paper shows that these policies and institutional changes may not be su¢cient to prevent crises in intermediate income countries and that …nancial crises may be a much more general phenomenon in 17 The inclusion of credit constraints on investment in our model would reinforce the possibility of a crash as the fall in asset prices would reduce the value of collateral. those countries.
One implication of our model is that a clear incentive exists for the government of the emerging market to intervene directly on the stock market with a commitment to buy assets when the price falls below a certain level. These policies have been advocated and implemented during the Asian crisis.
However, these guarantees would quite naturally generate moral hazard problems which themselves can be at the origin of a …nancial crisis (Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999 ) . Hence, an interesting possible extension of our model would be to formalize the trade-o¤ between endogenous incentives for government guarantees and moral hazard consequences. Appendix II: The characteristics of the 6 6 and >> curves For equation (13) , the slope is:
For equation (14) , the slope is:
Appendix III: The e¤ect of a symmetric decrease in transaction costs An increase in ; has always a positive impact on > as long as > = 1, that is as long as
To see this, use equilibrium equations (13) and (14) to get ?>+?;:
which is positive if 8 5 = 1+2. Combining this with the fact that 67+ 63 = 0 on the >> curve also proves that the 6 6 and >> curves cross only once in the relevant range (0 = > = 1) so that a unique "good" exists. This is because if the two curves were to cross more than once in the relevant range, they would have to cross three times (the 6 6 curve starts over the >> curve and in > = 1 is below the >> curve if 8 5 = 1+2). In this case a downward shift of the >> curve (caused by an increase in ;) would have to imply that for some parameters, a decrease in > is possible. As ?>+?; , 0 always, this is not possible.
Appendix IV: Asymmetric equilibria in the emerging market Suppose only a portion D " = 1 of the # agents in the emerging market invest. The stock market equilibrium relation as well as the income relation can easily be rewritten accordingly and it can be checked that world income is the same as in the text. For 0 = D " = 1, the pro…t of investing must be zero, or using the the constant world income equation:
The intuition is that an increase in the relative price of assets in the emerging market induces entry which in this case implies a rise in the proportion of agents who invest. It proves convenient to rewrite the …xed cost as % = F% 1 . We then get D " + > ¡2 = 1 97, . A modi…ed 6 6 curve is derived from the de…nition of aggregate income in the emerging economy:
) and the zero pro…t condition. This de…nes 8 2 the share of aggregate income in the emerging market as an increasing function of >:
A modi…ed >> curve is derived from the stock market equilibrium:
with D " de…ned by the zero pro…t condition. It can be shown that such an equilibrium for which 0 = D " = 1 never exists if F = 1. This implies that only the equilibrium with all agents investing exists.
An example where an asymmetric equilibrium exists is in the autarky situation (; = 0) if F , 1. In this case, a symmetric equilibrium with D " = 1 cannot be an equilibrium as it would involve negative pro…ts. It can be shown easily that D " = 1+F = 1. In cases with ; , 0, asymmetric equilibria can exist if F is su¢ciently larger than one. From (A4) and (A5), it can be checked that the modi…ed 6 6 and >> curves are similar to those depeicted in …gure 5. In particular, a decrease in transaction costs has a similar impact whereas all or only a portion of agents invest. The new >> curve shifts to the right as in …gure 5 so that both > and 8 2 rise. The intuition is the same as in the same text but now a new variable ajusts: D " , the portion of agents who invest. As transaction costs decrease, this portion increases in the emerging market and the price of assets in the industrialized country decrease so > increases. When the level of transaction costs is low enough, all agents in the emerging market invest and we are back to the case analysed in the main text. Hence, the asymmetric equilibria are not qualitatively di¤erent from the symmetric ones.
Appendix V: Asymmetric transaction costs A increase in ; $% shifts the >> curve to the right as from equation (22) 
We can sign this expression by the restriction that 8 2 = 1. : " with G , 1, so that we retain the convexity property of the cost function. In this case, the 6 6 schedule becomes:
and the >> curve: then a symmetric decrease in transaction costs can lead to a decrease in asset price and income in the emerging market. At some point however the lower transaction costs lead to increase in asset prices and income. The reason for this result is that the slope of the >> is also altered by a change in ;.
The e¤ect of an increase in ; on the >> curve can be analyzed by looking at how Hence, when the cost function is not very convex, …nancial globalization can in a …rst phase decrease asset prices and income in the emerging market especially if its productivity level is low. In this case, it also leads in a …rst phase to a current account surplus in the emerging market. The intuition is that in this case (which can also be interpreted as high risk aversion case) the diversi…cation purpose is strong relative to the arbitrage one: this implies that agents in the industrialized country will not exploit much the di¤erence in price between markets when transaction costs go down (at least for high transaction costs) but agents in the emerging market will want to diversify and buy assets in the industrialized country.
The analysis of the possibility of a crash driven by self-ful…lling expectations is more complex but not fundamentally altered in the case of a more general cost function as long as it is convex. It implies …nding parameter values for which the investment is zero if agents expect zero investment and positive if they expect positive investment. Because we want to focus on the consequences of lower productivity and wage in emerging market compared to industrialized countries, we have not allowed for di¤erent population size between the two countries. Doing this has potentially important consequences because of two features in our model: the market size e¤ect and the fact that a larger population implies a larger number of projects/assets.
Hence both demand and supply of assets are a¤ected. To see this suppose now that wages are identical in the two countries but that populations (rather than being equal as in the paper) are # " and # ! respectively. The 6 6 curve becomes:
where 8 2 = # " 6 " +(# " 6 " + # ! 6 ! ) is now the share of the ! country in aggregate world income.
The >> curve is now:
The equilibrium is graphed on …gure 10 where we assumed that # " = # ! :
It can be shown that the equilibrium relative price when ; = 1 is less than 1. Hence, imperfect integration of …nancial markets implies lower asset prices in the small country. From this point of view the e¤ect resembles a lot the market size e¤ect when wages di¤er. An increase in population size has however an ambiguous e¤ect. As shown on …gure 10 both the 6 6 and >> curves are a¤ected. This is because both demand and supply of assets are increased. It can be shown that for low levels of ; (high transaction costs), the supply e¤ect dominates so that an increase in # " implies a decrease It can be shown that at ; = 0 and ; = 1, asset prices are identical (> = 1) in the two countries (again as long as wage rates are identical) even if population di¤er. At ; = 1, perfect capital mobility, the reason is again perfect arbitrage. At ; = 0, …nancial autarky, this is because the demand and the supply e¤ect of population size cancel each other. A small population implies a lower demand for assets but also implies a small number of assets. Given this, it can be shown that the relative price of assets > is U-shaped as a function of ; when wages are equal and # " =# ! .
It can be checked that in the case of pessimistic expectations the expected pro…t function in the "pessimistic" country is U-shaped as in …gure 5. Equation (18) in the text is still valid but with
It can then be shown that the expected "pessimistic" pro…t function of the smaller country (in terms of non capital aggregate income) is always below the one of the larger country. The reason the ambiguous e¤ect of large population on asset prices that applies in the optimistic case does not apply when we analyse the vulnerability of crashes is a particular assumption in our model. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the economy in the …rst period starts with zero zero capital stock or zero projects. Suppose however that agents are endowed with projects. If the aggregate endowment of projects depends positively on population size, a reasonnable assumption, and as projects/assets are substitutes, larger population size would increase the supply of assets and have a negative impact on asset prices in the crash equilibrium. The positive demand e¤ect of larger population would still play a role so that the e¤ect of population size on …nancial vulnerability would be ambiguous as it is on asset prices in the optimistic equilibrium.
